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INTRODUCTION 
Sweet Briar College was established over a century ago by the 
will of a prominent Virginia landowner, Indiana Fletcher Wil-
liams, as an institute for the education of young women. Located 
in the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains on a breath-taking 
3250-acre former plantation, the campus is a National Historic 
District and home to twenty-one buildings on the Virginia Land-
marks Register and the National Register of Historic Places.
1
 
Chartered in 1901 by the Virginia General Assembly, the school 
officially opened its doors in 1906.
2
 Since then, Sweet Briar has 
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 1. Karin Kapsidelis, Sweet Briar Campus on List of Endangered Historic Places, 
RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (May 18, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.richmond.com/news/article_ 
1a2738fd-d30c-5e15-afca-9286cfcd6471.html. 
 2. Graduate Catalog 2010-2011, SWEET BRIAR COLLEGE 5, 30, http://oldweb.sbc.edu/ 
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developed into a well-respected educational institution for young 
women and has carried out its mission to ―empower and educate 
young women to build and reshape their world . . . .‖
3
 
Despite the school‘s storied past and deep historical roots, on 
March 3, 2015, the Sweet Briar Board of Directors announced its 
intention to shut down the college—permanently—the following 
summer.
4
 The Board cited ―insurmountable financial challenges,‖ 
including falling enrollment, a lack of unrestricted funds in its 
endowment, and the century-old school‘s lack of appeal to modern 
generations of students.
5
 The Board claimed the school was no 
longer financially viable, because though its $84 million endow-
ment was sizeable by most measures, the school needed an en-
dowment three times that size to stay open.
6
 Students, faculty, 
staff, and alumnae were blindsided by the news that their college 
would abruptly shut its doors. Unanswered questions led to con-
troversy and distrust, and groups of Sweet Briar supporters were 
galvanized to take action.
7
 
Immediately following the announcement, a movement to halt 
the school‘s closure arose and quickly gained momentum, leading 
to a hotly contested legal battle that went from the circuit court 
to the Supreme Court of Virginia and back again. Amherst Coun-
ty Attorney, Ellen Bowyer, boldly brought the principal lawsuit in 
the name of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
8
 The lawsuit alleged 
the College had violated the Virginia Charitable Solicitations Act 
by using charitable funds, raised to operate the school, for the 
purpose of closing it instead.
9
 The lawsuit also claimed violations 
of the Virginia Uniform Trust Code. In the end, the supporters of 
Sweet Briar won.
10
 This is their story. 
Part I provides an in-depth factual overview, beginning with 
the college‘s founding in the early 1900s. The commentary then 
 
sites/default/files/*/Graduate%20Catalog%202010-11.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
 3. Welcome, SWEET BRIAR COLLEGE, http://sbc.edu/about/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
 4. See discussion infra Part I. 
 5. See infra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See infra notes 41–46 and accompanying text. 
 8. Complaint at 1, Commonwealth ex rel. Bowyer v. Sweet Briar Inst., No. 
CL15009373-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 30, 2015) (Amherst County) (unpublished decision). 
 9. Id. at 1–2. 
 10. See discussion infra Part I.D. 
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turns to the controversial decision to close and discusses the facts 
and legal theories of the case, the decisions by the circuit court 
and the Supreme Court of Virginia, and the eventual settlement 
that kept the school alive. 
In Part II, the discussion shifts to the landmark nature of this 
case, not only for Sweet Briar College, but also for other Virginia 
colleges and non-profits around the country. The essay analyzes 
the legal questions arising from the case, including whether a 
Virginia corporation could also be a trustee, and, what were the 
Board‘s legal obligations in this case? 
I.   FACTUAL OVERVIEW 
A.  Sweet Briar Institute Established in 1901 
Sweet Briar College (more formally known as Sweet Briar In-
stitute) opened its doors in rural Amherst County, Virginia, in 
1906.
11
 Officially chartered in 1901, the college was established by 
the will of Indiana Fletcher Williams (the ―Will‖),
12
 who left her 
family‘s former Sweet Briar plantation land for the purpose of es-
tablishing an institute that would educate young women.
13
 The 
Will directed that Williams‘ property be used to establish and 
maintain a women‘s college ―upon the conditions and for the pur-
poses hereinafter declared . . . namely: The said corporation shall 
. . . establish and shall maintain and carry on . . . a school or sem-
inary, to be known as the ‗Sweet Briar Institute,‘ for the educa-
 
 11. History, SWEET BRIAR COLLEGE, http://sbc.edu/about/history/ (last visited Oct. 3, 
2016. 
 12. Id.; see also Will of Indiana Fletcher Williams, ARCHIVE.ORG 2–3, https://archive. 
org/stream/willofindianafle00unse#page/n3/mode/2up (last visited Oct. 3, 2016) [hereinaf-
ter The Will]. 
 13. The Will, supra note 12, at 2–3. Note that the Will actually provided ―for the edu-
cation of white girls and young women.‖ Id. at 3. During the Civil Rights Era, the College 
took legal action to make a revision to the charter in order to allow African-American 
women of other races to be students at the school. Sweet Briar College: History, PLEXUSS, 
https://plexuss.com/college/sweet-briar-college (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). The request to 
alter the Will was initially denied, with the trial court citing the ―plain, unambiguous, 
conclusive, and binding‖ language of the Will. Id. Although the three-judge federal court 
initially abstained from addressing the issue, the matter was then taken before the Su-
preme Court, which reversed the district court and remanded the case. Sweet Briar Inst. 
v. Button, 387 U.S. 423, 423 (1967) (per curiam). Upon remand, the federal district court 
granted a permanent injunction barring enforcement by the Commonwealth of the racial 
restriction on grounds that such enforcement action would violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Sweet Briar Inst. v. Button, 280 F. Supp. 312, 312 (W.D. Va. 1967). 
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tion of . . . girls and young women.‖
14
 The Will directs that the col-
lege be established as ―a perpetual memorial‖ to Williams‘ daugh-
ter, Daisy.
15
 It provides that ―[n]o part of the [donated land] shall 
at any time be sold or alienated by the corporation‖ and that ―[t]he 
personal property herein given shall be kept inviolate as an en-
dowment fund, which shall be invested and re-invested by the 
corporation, and of which the income only shall be used for the 
support and maintenance of the school,‖ except that the corpora-
tion is authorized to expend a part of the principal for construct-
ing and equipping capital improvements.
16
 
This clear and unambiguous testamentary document was fol-
lowed by action of the Virginia General Assembly, which adopted 
the Charter of Sweet Briar Institute, a nonprofit corporation (the 
―Charter‖).
17
 The Charter instructed the corporation to ―accept the 
real and personal property . . . devised and bequeathed [in the 
Will], subject to the terms and conditions specifically prescribed in 
the said will.‖
18
  
With its rural location and idyllic campus, Sweet Briar devel-
oped as a premiere educational institution for young women over 
its hundred-plus year history. Enrollment was intentionally kept 
small, despite the sprawling physical campus.
19
 Sweet Briar 
aimed to be as highly regarded as other prominent women‘s col-
leges, such as Smith, Mount Holyoke, and Wellesley.
20
 At the 
same time, given Indiana Williams‘ directive that students be 
―useful members of society‖ upon graduation, Sweet Briar sought 
to distinguish its curriculum from that of its role models.
21
 Sweet 
Briar became known for its practical, hands-on curricular model. 
While the College slowly became a more traditional liberal arts 
 
 14. The Will, supra note 12, at 2–3 (emphasis added). 
 15. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
 16. Id. 
 17. 1901 Va. Acts ch. 123. 
 18. Id. (emphasis added). 
 19. See Sheryl Stolberg, Anger and Activism Greet Plan to Shut Sweet Briar College, 
N.Y TIMES (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/23/education/sweet-briars-
imminent-closing-stirs-small-uprising-in-a-college-idyll.html?_r=0. 
 20. Best Women’s Colleges, BESTCOLLEGES.COM, http://www.bestcolleges.com/features 
/top-womens-colleges/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
 21. The Will, supra note 12, at 4. 
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school over the years, Sweet Briar stayed true to its core mission 
of offering hands-on education to young women.
22
 
B.  Decision to Close 
On February 28, 2015, meeting behind closed doors, the Sweet 
Briar Board of Directors voted to shut down the college.
23
 This de-
cision, which was not announced until March 3, cited ―insur-
mountable financial challenges.‖
24
 Among those supposed chal-
lenges were falling enrollment rates, an alleged lack of 
unrestricted funds in the endowment, the declining appeal of a 
women-only liberal arts education, and an insufficient alumnae 
base for fundraising.
25
 
Interim President James Jones and the Board of Directors 
made their case for closure: unrestricted funds in the school‘s $84 
million endowment were insufficient to cover operating costs and 
outstanding debts.
26
 According to the Board, $65 million of the 
$84 million endowment was restricted and could not be used for 
ongoing operations at the College.
27
 
The policies Sweet Briar had implemented in the past decade— 
such as discounting tuition for low-income students, minorities 
and first generation students
28
—backfired by dramatically lower-
 
 22. Mission, SWEET BRIAR COLLEGE (May 2004), http://sbc.edu/about/mission/. 
 23. Amy Friedenberger, Sweet Briar College Faculty Passes Resolution Opposing Clo-
sure, ROANOKE TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015, 9:02 PM), http://www.roanoke.com/news/educat 
ion/higher_education/sweet-briar-college-faculty-passes-resolution-opposing-closure/article 
_dec8426a-e75e-585a-970f-aabc0fc96774.html. 
 24. Id.; Nick Anderson & Susan Svrluga, Sweet Briar College to Close Because of Fi-
nancial Challenges, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
grade-point/wp/2015/03/03/sweet-briar-college-to-close-because-of-financial-challenges/. 
 25. Abigail Jones, The End of Sweet Briar College and the Problem with Women’s Col-
leges, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 29, 2015, 6:26 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/05/08/end-
sweet-briar-college-and-problem-womens-colleges-326363.html. 
 26. Peter Jacobs, ‘Something Just Doesn’t Add Up’ with an Imploding College’s Finan-
cials, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 16, 2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/sweet-briar-
college-financials-2015-3. According to the Board of Directors and President Jones, the 
College‘s endowment had dropped from $96.2 million to $84 million between 2011 and 
2015. Id. 
 27. Jones, supra note 25. 
 28. See Catherine Morris, Alumnae Declare Victory in Fight to Save Sweet Briar, 
DIVERSE ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC. (June 22, 2015), http://diverseeducation.com/article/ 
74105/. This policy was adopted in reaction to a study on demographic changes in the 
makeup of women‘s colleges published by the University of California, Los Angeles. See 
LINDA J. SAX, JENNIFER BERDAN LOZANO & COLLEEN QUINN VANDENBOOM, WHO ATTENDS 
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ing the number of students paying full price.
29
 The College could 
no longer cover operating costs with tuition alone. By the fall of 
2014, 43 percent of Sweet Briar students received federal need-
based financial aid in the form of Pell grants.
30
 ―[B]oth Mr. Jones 
and Paul Rice, the board chairman, said Sweet Briar‘s rich-girl 
days were long gone. . . . Of students who entered in fall 2014, 
Mr. Jones said, 43 percent received Pell grants, federal aid for 
needy students; 37 percent are first-generation College students; 
and 32 percent are minorities.‖
31
 Even adding an engineering ma-
jor in 2005 did not increase enrollment.
32
 Enrollment—and espe-
cially enrollment of students paying full tuition—had undeniably 
dropped. 
Jones cited financial reports that estimated the College had 
$28 million in deferred maintenance and $25 million in debt.
33
 
These reports were prepared by financial consultants hired as the 
Board of Directors planned to shut the college down—consultants 
who claimed the school would require a $250 million endowment 
in order to survive.
34
 Jones and the Board also claimed that they 
had recently conducted a fundraising study, which had deter-
mined that there was an inadequate base of prospective donors to 
support the College.
35
 The Board also cited a wide range of options 
they had considered, such as going coeducational or merging with 
another school, but claimed it found no viable option that could 
keep the College operating.
36
 
 
A WOMEN‘S COLLEGE? IDENTIFYING UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS AND PATTERNS OF CHANGE, 
1971–2011, UCLA, at iv–vi (Sept. 2014). The study and its use in justifying the decision to 
close the College was later criticized by Sweet Briar College Professor Dan Gottlieb, for 
basing its conclusions on an artificially high sample size from historically black women‘s 
colleges. See Dan Gottlieb, Enrollment, Race, and the Unfortunate Case of Dr. Sax’s Sam-
ple Bias: The Sweet Briar Story, Part 2, UNSOLICITED GURU (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www. 
unsolicited.guru/sweet-briar/enrollment-race-and-the-unfortunate-case-of-dr-saxs-sample-
bias-the-sweet-briar-story-part-2/. 
 29. Gottlieb, supra note 28. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Stolberg, supra note 19. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Elizabeth H.S. Wyatt & Sandra A. Taylor, Sweet Briar Directors Faced an Impos-
sibly Difficult Decision, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Apr. 29, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.rich 
mond.com/opinion/their-opinion/guest-columnists/article_6684faad-1a48-59ff-ac0e-23e023 
a4b3fd.html. 
 36. Stolberg, supra note 19. 
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The Board also cited a ―Donor Insight Survey,‖ by Grenzebach 
Glier and Associates, which they termed a ―fundraising feasibil-
ity‖
37
 study in support of their conclusion that an appeal to alum-
nae would be ―insufficient in its results and counterproductive in 
its nature.‖
38
 Critics later pointed out that the survey actually 
was not a ―feasibility study‖ and employed methodology that 
would have been improper for such a study and argued that its 
results were being misinterpreted by both the Board and Jones.
39
 
Students, parents, faculty, and alumnae were skeptical of 
Jones‘ and the Board‘s assessment of the college‘s viability. Many 
wondered aloud why the Board had not been more forthcoming 
with its alumnae, who might have donated in greater numbers to 
aid their beloved alma mater, had they known it was in such sup-
posedly dire straits.
40
 Conspiracy theories abounded. Some felt 
Jones had been brought in by the Board as ―an axman‖ to shut 
the school down.
41
 Questions were raised about the approximately 
$84 million endowment and how much of it was actually unavail-
able to meet operating costs.
42
 Others asked: Who benefits from 
closing the College?
43
 Leading to more distrust by alumnae, it was 
 
 37. Resolution of the Board of Directors of Sweet Briar Institute (Feb. 28, 2015), https: 
//savingsweetbriar.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/College-Demurrer-compressed_Redact 
ed.pdf. 
 38. Elizabeth H.S. Wyatt, We Tried Hard, But Sweet Briar’s Problems Are Terminal, 
WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/we-tried-hard-but-sweet-briars-
problems-are-terminal-1433274483; see also Sarah Clement & Edie McRee Bowles, Clos-
ing Sweet Briar Isn’t Justified, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (May 4, 2015, 10:30 PM), http:// 
www.richmond.com/opinion/their-opinion/guest-columnists/article_a6764e23-2a28-5237-9 
ccf-e7e626914049.html; Elizabeth H.S. Wyatt & Sandra A. Taylor, Sweet Briar Directors 
Faced an Impossibly Difficult Decision, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Apr. 29, 2015, 10:30 PM), 
http://www.richmond.com/opinion/their-opinion/guest-columnists/article_6684faad-1a48-5 
9ff-ac0e-23e023a4b3fd.html. 
 39. See Stacey Sickels Locke, Donor Insights Study Analysis (Not a Feasibility Study): 
My Response to Board Member’s Erroneous Statements in National Media, BEING 
UNLOCKED (Jun. 3, 2015), http://beingunlocked.com/2015/06/donor-insights-study-an-anal 
ysis-by-a-donor-professional-fundraiser/. 
 40. See, e.g., id. 
 41. Stolberg, supra note 19. 
 42. See Susan Svrluga, Lawsuit Seeks to Stop Sweet Briar College From Closing, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2015 
/03/30/lawsuit-seeks-to-stop-sweet-briar-college-from-closing/. 
 43. Because so many of the stated rationales for closure appeared questionable to the 
alumnae, speculation arose about whether other motivations could explain the decision. 
See Elizabeth MacDonald, Emac’s Bottom Line: Saving Sweet Briar, FOXBUSINESS (June 
18, 2015), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2015/06/18/saving-sweet-briar.html (noting 
that ―[a]lumnae and former board members . . . ask who benefits from shutting Sweet Bri-
ar, to, say, sell it for another purpose, since the college sits near an economic development 
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revealed that the Board‘s decision to close came just a few weeks 
after it accepted a $1 million donation from a donor in her estate 
plan, in response to which, Interim President Jones wrote in a 
thank you letter: ―What a wonderful thing you have done!‖
44
 
The Board‘s decision led the College‘s faculty to pass, by unan-
imous vote, a declaration of no confidence in the President and 
Board of Trustees, formally asking them all to resign.
45
 Notably, 
the no-confidence vote stated that ―the decision of the Board of 
Directors to close the College was made without consultation with 
the Faculty and other stakeholders of the College in any stage of 
the process, and without allowing any or all of those groups to 
propose solutions to the current financial challenges. . . .‖
46
 
C.  Legal Challenges to Closure 
Galvanized into action by news of the institution‘s pending clo-
sure, Sweet Briar supporters quickly responded. Integral to 
events that follow was the formation of Saving Sweet Briar, Inc., 
(―Saving Sweet Briar‖) an alumnae-run organization created to 
organize the effort to keep the college open. Saving Sweet Briar 
retained legal counsel and began planning its legal strategy.
47
 
 
zone and a major highway?‖). After the agreement to save the College was reached, it 
came to light that discussions were ongoing between the College‘s previous administration 
and the University of Virginia (―UVa‖). Steve Kolowich, That Time Sweet Briar Tried to 
Merge with the U. of Virginia, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (July 14, 2015), http: 
//chronicle.com/article/That-Time-Sweet-Briar-Tried-to/231573. These discussions included 
email correspondence between Sweet Briar Board Member and UVa professor emeritus 
David W. Breneman and UVa Provost John Simon about ―the Sweet Briar conversation.‖ 
Id. (Breneman and Interim President Jones each were former Presidents of Kalamazoo 
College.) They also included a meeting between Jones and then-UVa Rector George Keith 
Martin. Id. Martin‘s notes show that a ―[p]roposal to make Sweet Briar an extension of 
UVa‖ was discussed. Id. The discussions never materialized into an agreement, and it is 
unclear what role the prospects of such a deal may have played in the decision to close. Id. 
 44. Ruth  McCambridge,  The  Sweet  Briar  Donor  Acknowledgement  Letter Used  in 
Suit to Block School’s Closing, NONPROFIT Q. (Apr. 2, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly. 
org/2015/04/02/the-sweet-briar-donor-acknowledgement-letter-used-in-suit-to-block-school-
s-closing. 
 45. Susan Svrulga, Sweet Briar Faculty Unanimously Votes No Confidence in the Pres-
ident and Board, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/gra 
de-point/wp/2015/03/31/sweet-briar-faculty-unanimously-votes-no-confidence-in-the-presi 
dent-and-board/. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Sweet Briar College Alumnae Hire Prominent Law Firm to Fight Closure of Col-
lege, SAVINGSWEETBRIAR.COM (Mar. 6, 2015), http://savingsweetbriar.com/sweet-briar-
college-alumnae-hire-prominent-law-firm-to-fight-closure-of-law-firm/. 
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Although not immediately apparent to the public, Saving 
Sweet Briar and its counsel were working behind the scenes with 
the Amherst County Attorney, Ellen Bowyer. After settlement 
overtures were rejected, Bowyer filed suit on March 30, 2015.
48
 
This suit was entitled Commonwealth of Virginia, ex rel. Ellen 
Bowyer, in her official capacity as County Attorney for the County 
of Amherst, Virginia v. Sweet Briar Institute.
49
 Bringing a suit in 
the name of the Commonwealth avoided sticky legal issues that 
would have complicated the case had Saving Sweet Briar—a 
group of alumnae—been the named plaintiff instead. 
Shortly thereafter, another suit, Jessica Campbell v. Sweet 
Briar Institute, was brought on behalf of several students of the 
college and their parents.
50
 These students, once on their way to 
receiving a degree from the unique women‘s liberal arts institu-
tion, now sought to regain this opportunity by claiming that the 
Board‘s action to close the College constituted a breach of con-
tract.
51
 
Another lawsuit, John Gregory Brown v. Sweet Briar Institute, 
was brought by a group of fifty faculty and staff members of 
Sweet Briar College.
52
 This particular suit, unlike the others, was 
not designed to try to keep the college open. Rather, this group of 
college employees alleged a breach of their employment contracts 
after being terminated pursuant to the Board‘s decision to close.
53
 
But, it was the Bowyer lawsuit that commanded center stage.
54
 
Bowyer sought injunctive relief to block Sweet Briar‘s closing 
pursuant to both the Virginia Charitable Solicitations Act and the 
 
 48. Complaint, Commonwealth ex rel. Bowyer v. Sweet Briar Inst., No. CL15009373-
00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 30, 2015) (Amherst County) (unpublished decision). 
 49. No. CL150619, 2015 Va. LEXIS 22 (Va. June 9, 2015) (unpublished decision). 
 50. Complaint at 1, Campbell v. Sweet Briar Inst., No. CL15009390-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. 
Apr. 17, 2015) (Amherst County) (unpublished decision). 
 51. See id. at 1–2, 7; see also Jessie Pounds, Complaints Seek Injunctions to Stop 
Sweet Briar College Closure, NEWS & ADVANCE (Mar. 30, 2015, 10:45 PM) http://www. 
newsadvance.com/news/local/complaints-seek-injunctions-to-stop-sweet-briar-college-clos 
ure/article_a22e6b 76-d 721-11e4-a656-5be3e8ff0f16.html. 
 52. Complaint at 2–3, Brown v. Sweet Briar Inst., No. CL15009395-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. 
Apr. 24, 2015) (Amherst County) (unpublished decision). 
 53. Id. 
   54. For purposes of this article, the authors refer to the plaintiff in the Common-
wealth of Virginia, ex rel. Ellen Bowyer, in her official capacity as County Attorney for the 
County of Amherst, Virginia v. Sweet Briar Institute as either ―Bowyer‖ or the ―Common-
wealth.‖ 
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Virginia Uniform Trust Code.
55
 She alleged that the Board was in 
violation of Virginia Code section 57-57(N) of the Charitable So-
licitations Act by using charitable donations, raised to operate the 
college, to close the school instead.
56
 In what became known as the 
―Orphaned Funds‖ claim, Bowyer further argued that it was im-
permissible to use even unrestricted funds for closure because, by 
doing so, the Board necessarily would render itself unable to use 
the remaining funds in accordance with the purpose for which 
they were given.
57
 Bowyer also argued that the Board was a trus-
tee of a charitable trust and was acting in violation of its fiduci-
ary duties under the Uniform Trust Code, Virginia Code section 
64.2-700.
58
 
In opposing Bowyer‘s claims, the Board argued that the College 
was not a trustee, an argument it based on an earlier case in 
which alumnae unsuccessfully opposed the coeducation of a wom-
en‘s college, Dodge v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon Women’s Col-
lege.
59
 The Board also argued that, as a county attorney, Bowyer 
lacked standing to enforce a charitable trust under the Code.
60
 
Bowyer‘s standing was an issue of contention throughout the 
case.
61
 It was argued that the Attorney General has sole authority 
to enforce these statutes on behalf of the Commonwealth.
62
 While 
Virginia Code section 57-59(D) expressly empowers a county at-
torney to enforce the Charitable Solicitations Act.
63
 It is less clear 
 
 55. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Injunction at 19, Common-
wealth ex rel. Bowyer v. Sweet Briar Inst., No CL15009373-00-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 7, 
2015) [hereinafter Motion for Temporary Injunction] (Amherst County). 
 56. See id. at 24–25. 
 57. Id. at 15. 
 58. See id. at 27; see also Petition for Review Pursuant to Code § 8.01-626, Common-
wealth ex rel. Bowyer v. Sweet Briar Inst., No. 150619, 2015 LEXIS 22 (Va. Apr. 29, 2015) 
[hereinafter Petition for Review] (unpublished decision). 
 59. See Petition for Review, supra note 58, at 9; Dodge v. Trs. of Randolph-Macon 
Woman‘s Coll., 276 Va. 10, 12–14, 661 S.E.2d 805, 806–07 (2008). 
 60. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Appeal at 6, Commonwealth ex rel. Bowyer 
v. Sweet Briar Inst., No. 150619, 2015 Va. LEXIS 22 (Va. May 5, 2015) [hereinafter Brief 
in Opposition to Petition for Appeal]. 
 61. See Demurrer and Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Complaint for Lack of Stand-
ing at 6, Commonwealth ex rel. Bowyer v. Sweet Briar Inst., No. CL15009373-00 (Va. Cir. 
Ct. Apr. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss] (Amherst County) (unpublished deci-
sion). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See VA. CODE ANN. § 57-59(D) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (empowering a county attorney, 
among other officials, to bring action on behalf of the Commonwealth upon reasonable be-
lief that a violation of the Act has occurred or will occur). 
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who may enforce a charitable trust under the Uniform Trust 
Code‘s vaguely worded provisions, which grants standing to ―[t]he 
settlor . . . among others.‖
64
 
D.  Challenges to the Factual Basis for the Closure Decision 
Opponents of closure challenged the litany of negative facts 
and trends cited by the Board and Interim President Jones in 
support of their decision to close the College.
65
 The previous ad-
ministration pointed to dwindling enrollment, a significant tui-
tion discount rate, and the inability to raise sufficient funds as 
reasons why the school was no longer financially viable.
66
 But, 
through diligent research and analysis, opponents of closure were 
able to cast doubt on these assertions. 
Opponents of closure alleged that the Board made no meaning-
ful attempt to address the challenges faced by the school. They 
noted that, as recently as 2008, Sweet Briar had a successful cap-
ital campaign in which it raised $110 million; however, the Board 
had declined to launch another capital campaign.
67
 Additionally, 
dissident Board members, who had sought to present information 
in support of keeping the school open, claimed that they had been 
forced to resign as a result of their criticism.
68
 As a result, some 
alleged that those driving the Board‘s decision to close had nefar-
ious intentions and were planning to sell the College‘s vast real 
estate to developers; however, their ―conspiracy theories‖ were 
never substantiated. 
1.  Financial Condition 
Saving Sweet Briar hired a forensic accountant, Steven 
Spitzer, to examine the school‘s financial condition and produce a 
report, the Preliminary Analysis of Financial Condition of Sweet 
 
 64. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-723(C) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
 65. See Motion for Temporary Injunction, supra note 55, at 10–12. 
 66. Exhibit A to Demurrer and Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Complaint for Lack 
of Standing, Commonwealth ex rel. Bowyer v. Sweet Briar Inst., No. CL15009373-00 (Va. 
Cir. Ct. Apr. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Exhibit A to Motion to Dismiss] (Amherst County) (un-
published decision). 
 67. Id.; Clement & Bowles, supra note 38. 
 68. See Motion for Temporary Injunction, supra note 55, at 8. 
SWEETBRIAR 511.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2016  1:14 PM 
238 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:227 
 
Briar Institute (the ―Spitzer Report‖).
69
 Spitzer based his analysis 
on audited financial statements for the year ending June 2014 
(the last report available) and concluded that ―the College was 
not in dire financial straits just eight months before the College‘s 
Board and Interim President announced they were closing‖ and 
accordingly, it did not need to close.
70
 
In his report, Spitzer also relied on information from three 
reputable sources to arrive at the conclusion the college was fi-
nancially healthy.
71
 First, the Spitzer Report relied on a study in 
Forbes magazine analyzing the financial health of non-profit in-
stitutions. Forbes gave Sweet Briar a grade of ―A,‖ and ranked it 
88 out of more than 900 institutions studied.
72
 Only four Virginia 
colleges studied by Forbes ranked above Sweet Briar; the remain-
ing 23 fell below Sweet Briar in terms of financial health.
73
 Se-
cond, the Spitzer Report relied on the Composite Financial Index 
(the ―CFI‖)—a metric developed by several consulting groups and 
endorsed by the Council of Independent Colleges, which assigns 
institutions a score on a scale of -4 to 10, with any score greater 
than 3 indicating a strong financial position.
74
 The CFI for Sweet 
Briar was 5.09 in 2014 and 4.72 in 2013, indicating that the Col-
lege was financially stable.
75
 Finally, the U.S. Department of Ed-
 
 69. UPDATE: CPA Releases Report on Sweet Briar’s Finances; School Responds, 
WSET (Apr. 7, 2015), http://wset.com/news/sweet-briar-closing/sweet-briar-college-respon 
ds-to-forensic-accountants-review. 
 70. R. STEVEN SPITZER, PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CONDITIONS OF SWEET 
BRIAR INSTITUTE (Apr. 6, 2015) [hereinafter SPITZER REPORT], http://savingsweetbriar. 
com/preliminary-analysis-of-financial-condition-of-sweet-briar-institute-sweet-briar-colleg 
es-financial-condition-did-not-war rant-closure/. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.; Forbes College Financial Grades SCRIBD (2014), https://www.scribd.com/doc/ 
155687329/. Forbes-College-Financial-Grades-As-and-Bs. 
 73. SPITZER REPORT, supra note 70. The only four Virginia colleges that ranked above 
Sweet Briar were Washington & Lee University, University of Richmond, Hollins Univer-
sity, and Randolph College. Id. 
 74. Id. The CFI is a tool that allows leaders of colleges and universities who have no 
background in finance or accounting to understand their institutions‘ overall financial 
health. Id. Additionally, to minimize reporting requirements the CFI is computed from 
data found in the U.S. Department of Education‘s Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System and IRS Form 990. Karla Hignite, Diagnosing Fiscal Fitness, NAT‘L ASSOC. 
OF COLL. & UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS (Apr. 2009), http://www.nacubo.org/Business_Officer_ 
Magazine/Magazine_Archives/April_2009/Diagnosing _Fiscal_Fitness.html. 
 75. SPITZER REPORT, supra note 70. Id. The CFI considers an institution‘s financial 
health with its ability to accomplish its mission. Scores should be evaluated over a three to 
five-year period. Hignite, supra note 74. A score of 3 indicates the institution has ―suffi-
cient and adequately managed resources to fulfill its mission objectives.‖ Id. An average 
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ucation (―USDOE‖) uses a financial responsibility composite score 
derived from official audited financial statements to determine an 
institution‘s financial health, and scores this overall financial 
health of institutions on a scale from -1.0 to 3.0.
76
 As noted in the 
Spitzer Report, the USDOE gave Sweet Briar the highest possible 
score of 3.0, as of June 30, 2014.
77
 
At the time of the Spitzer Report, Sweet Briar ranked seven-
teenth out of thirty-five public and private colleges in the region 
in terms of endowment size, and tenth out of thirty public and 
private schools in Virginia in terms of endowment size per stu-
dent.
78
 Furthermore, since 2009, the College‘s asset-to-liability ra-
tio had improved, and its endowment actually rose from $74.3 
million to $84 million.
79
 While the Board asserted that it needed a 
$250 million endowment for the College to remain open,
80
 the 
Spitzer Report noted that schools with endowments of that size 
typically dwarf Sweet Briar, and serve student populations more 
than ten times Sweet Briar‘s size.
81
 
2.  Enrollment 
According to the Board, another factor increasing the college‘s 
financial burden was declining enrollment.
82
 But, Sweet Briar‘s 
Dean of Enrollment from 2012 to 2013 disagreed, noting in the 
seven years leading up to the announcement to close, the school 
had seen three of its largest first-year classes in history in 2007, 
2008, and 2013.
83
 A mere eighteen months prior to the an-
nouncement to close, the school was experiencing record first-year 
enrollment.
84
 
 
score of 7–8 indicates the financial health of the institution is strong enough to allow for 
experimentation with new initiatives. Id. 
 76. Financial Responsibility Composite Scores, FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP‘T OF 
EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/school/composite-scores (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2016). 
 77. Id. 
 78. SPITZER REPORT, supra note 70. 
 79. Peter Jacobs, supra note 26. 
 80. Stolberg, supra note 19. 
 81. SPITZER REPORT, supra note 70 (citing schools with populations more than 10 
times the size of Sweet Briar with $250 million endowments). 
 82. Exhibit A to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 66. 
 83. See Motion for Temporary Injunction, supra note 55, at Exhibit F. 
 84. Id. 
SWEETBRIAR 511.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2016  1:14 PM 
240 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:227 
 
Prior to the Board‘s announcement to close Sweet Briar, 530 
students were enrolled at the college;
85
 but, with the senior class 
soon graduating, no new freshman class admitted, and others 
looking to transfer, it seemed to some that it was already too late 
to keep a student body interest. But, during his courtroom testi-
mony in April 2015, the former Sweet Briar Dean of Enrollment 
said he believed that enrollment of 225 at the start of the new ac-
ademic year would represent success in light of the detrimental 
effect of the announcement to close.
86
 By August 2015, within six 
weeks after the settlement keeping the college open, the school 
had exceeded the goal of 225 students and enrolled 320 stu-
dents,
87
 with a long term enrollment goal of 800.
88
 
3.  Debt and Donor Base 
According to Scott Shank, the Vice President for Finance and 
Administration when closure was announced, the threat of de-
fault on $25 million of outstanding bonds was a contributing fac-
tor in the Board‘s decision.
89
 Under the terms of one of the bonds, 
if the College failed to maintain a certain liquidity ratio while 
simultaneously failing to meet an S&P credit rating of BBB, the 
banks could trigger a default on the outstanding bonds.
90
 
But only one of these triggers occurred when the S&P credit 
rating of the bonds dropped below BBB. And that only occurred 
after the announcement to close was made, not before.
91
 The se-
 
 85. Jessie Pounds, Sweet Briar College Students Return to Campus, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH (Aug. 26, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/article_ 
18237524-3b44-54ce-947a-a1caf5713a6a.html. 
 86. Katrina Dix, For Sweet Briar, Emphasis Turns to Enrollment, NEWS & ADVANCE 
(July 15, 2015, 8:00 PM), www.newsadvance.com/news/local/for-sweet-briar-emphasis-
turns-to-enrollment/article_9b9df494-2b03-11e5-813c-df0a26a64098.html. 
 87. Sweet Briar College Fact Sheet 2015–16, SWEET BRIAR COLL., http://sbc.edu/insti 
tutional-research/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/sbc-fact-sheet-2015-2016.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2016). 
 88. Statement of Core Principles and Strategic Goals, SWEET BRIAR COLL., http://sbc. 
edu/president/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/sweet-briar-college-board-core-principles-and-str 
ategic-goals.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
 89. Sherese Gore, Bonds Spelled Trouble as Financial Problems Mounted at Sweet 
Briar College, NEWS & ADVANCE (May 3, 2015, 9:42 PM), http://www.newsadvance.com/ne 
ws/local/bonds-spelled-trouble-as-financial-problems-mounted-at-sweet-briar/article_e1224 
5e4-f1fe-11e4-849d-477891ca990b.html. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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cond requirement for default—the liquidity ratio—was never 
triggered, as the analysis to determine compliance with the li-
quidity ratio only occurred once yearly as of June 30. Thus, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the threat of the bonds being called 
could not have been a major reason for closure. 
4.  Legal Proceedings 
On April 7, 2015, Bowyer, on behalf of the Commonwealth, 
filed a motion for a temporary injunction, seeking to (1) bar the 
Board from taking steps or using funds to close the college; and 
(2) replace the Board with a court-appointed special fiduciary to 
operate the college and oversee its assets.
92
 The next day, the At-
torney General of Virginia filed an amicus brief to contest Bow-
yer‘s standing, a position also taken by the Board.
93
 At a hearing 
held on April 14, 2015, Bowyer announced that she had appointed 
Troutman Sanders—the same law firm that represented Saving 
Sweet Briar—as special counsel to assist her in presenting the 
case. The move sparked controversy. The Board claimed a conflict 
of interest, and the Attorney General took the position that only 
he could choose special counsel for the Commonwealth. 
The Board filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was 
not properly before the court on the theory that, as County Attor-
ney, Bowyer lacked standing to enforce the Uniform Trust Code.
94
 
The Board also relied heavily on its theory that under Dodge, the 
UTC does not apply to corporations. The Board claimed that, as a 
practical matter, the obligations of a corporation and a trustee 
could not coexist and that applying trust law to a charitable cor-
poration was not workable.
95
 
Judge Updike rejected the challenges to the Troutman Sanders‘ 
appointment, and the hearing proceeded the following day on 
Bowyer‘s motion for a temporary injunction. At the conclusion of 
the hearing, Judge Updike issued an order granting a sixty-day 
 
 92. See Motion for Temporary Injunction, supra note 55, at 33–34. 
 93. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Attorney General, Commonwealth ex rel. Bowyer v. 
Sweet Briar Inst., No CL15009373-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 2015) (Amherst County) (un-
published decision). 
 94. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 61, at 4. 
 95. See id. at 7. 
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injunction pursuant to the Charitable Solicitations Act,
96
 barring 
the use of solicited charitable funds to close the College, but deny-
ing an injunction pursuant to the Uniform Trust Code.
97
 At the 
urging of the Board, Judge Updike reasoned that Sweet Briar 
College was a charitable corporation and, ipso facto, could not be 
governed by the law of trusts.
98
 Judge Updike relied on the 2008 
decision in Dodge v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon Woman’s Col-
lege.
99
 In Dodge, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Ran-
dolph-Macon Woman‘s College was not a trust subject to Virginia 
Code section 55-541.02(B).
100
 
The Commonwealth subsequently filed a Petition for Review to 
the Supreme Court of Virginia to appeal the circuit court‘s ruling. 
In its Petition for Review, the Commonwealth sought a prelimi-
nary injunction, arguing that the circuit court (1) read too nar-
rowly the scope of its authority under the Charitable Solicitations 
Act; and (2) mistakenly asserted that Sweet Briar could not be 
both a corporation and a trustee subject to trust law.
101
 Specifical-
ly, Bowyer asserted that the circuit court misread the decision in 
Dodge and relied upon a ―false dichotomy‖ between status as a 
trustee and status as a corporation.
102
 She urged that the unique 
circumstances and characteristics, which arguably made Sweet 
Briar College both a corporation and a trustee, were not present 
in Dodge.
103
 
Perhaps the keystone of Bowyer‘s case before the supreme 
court was a brief amici curiae written by three iconic professors of 
 
 96. Judge in Sweet Briar Lawsuit Hearing Grants Temporary Injunction, WSLS (Apr. 
15, 2015, 8:55 PM), http://wsls.com/2015/04/15/judge-in-sweet-briar-lawsuit-hearing-grant 
s-temporary-injunction/. 
 97. Jessie Pounds, Judge’s Ruling Extends Efforts to Keep Sweet Briar College Open, 
NEWS & ADVANCE (Apr. 14, 2015, 7:30 PM), www.newsadvance.com/news/local/judge-s-rul 
ing-extends-efforts-to-keep-sweet-briar-college/article_3831e310-e2c0-11e4-afd2-3773ff62f 
dc4.html. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Karin Kapsidelis, Court Ruling Extends Efforts to Keep Sweet Briar Open, RICH. 
TIMES-DISPATCH (Apr. 14, 2015, 1:45 PM), http://www.richmond.com/news/article_9add 
e6aa-4b38-5d51-ba36-7150671d1767.html; Dodge v. Trs. of Randolph-Macon Woman‘s 
Coll., 276 Va. 10, 18, 661 S.E.2d 805, 809 (2008). 
 100. Dodge, 276 Va. 10, 18, 661 S.E.2d at 809. 
 101. Petition for Review, supra note 58, at 2. 
 102. Id. at 9–11. 
 103. Id. 
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trusts and estates law.
104
 The brief detailed why an organization 
can in fact be both a trustee and a corporation and argued that 
Sweet Briar met the criteria for this dual designation.
105
 Other 
amicus briefs were filed in support of Bowyer‘s petition by fund-
raising experts; a group of students, parents, alumnae; and a 
group of Virginia legislators.
106
 Although the Board asked the 
court not to consider the amicus briefs, the request was rejected 
and the briefs were received. 
In the meantime, the students and parents moved forward, 
seeking a lengthier injunction in their breach of contract case 
against the Board and bringing the matter for hearing on April 
28, 2015. At the hearing, Judge Updike granted a more extensive 
injunction—preventing the college from using ―general donations‖ 
for closure purposes for six months.
107
 
The parties in the Bowyer case were heard in oral argument 
before the supreme court on June 4, 2015.
108
 Bowyer argued that 
swift action was necessary to ensure that the College could actu-
ally be saved were the injunction to be granted.
109
 Tipping his 
hand perhaps, Chief Justice Don Lemons asked why the Board 
was trying so hard to close the College.
110
 
On June 9, the supreme court overruled Judge Updike, ex-
plaining that he erred when he held ―that the law of trusts cannot 
apply to a corporation.‖
111
 The supreme court remanded the case 
 
 104. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors J. Rodney Johnson, John E. Donaldson, and 
Robert T. Danforth in Support of Commonwealth‘s Petition for Review Pursuant to Code § 
8.01-626, Commonwealth ex rel. Bowyer v. Sweet Briar Inst., No. 150619, 2015 Va. LEXIS 
22 (June 9, 2015) [hereinafter Professors‘ Brief]. 
 105. See id. at 6. 
 106. Legal Proceedings, SAVING SWEET BRIAR, http://savingsweetbriar.com/legal-pro 
ceedings/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
 107. M. Grigsby, Judge Issues 2nd Injunction Against Sweet Briar, Amherst Co. Attor-
ney Appeals, WSLS (Apr. 29, 2015, 9:35 PM), http://wsls.com/2015/04/29/judge-issues-2nd-
injunction-against-sweet-briar-amherst-co-attorney-appeals/. 
 108. Supreme Court of Virginia Order Scheduling Oral Argument, SAVING SWEET 
BRIAR, https://savingsweetbriar.com/legal-proceedings/virginia-supreme-court-oral-argum 
ent-date/ (last visit Oct. 3, 2016). 
 109. Petition for Review, supra note 58, at 1. 
 110. Supreme Court of Virginia Audio Recordings of Oral Arguments, Commonwealth, 
ex rel., Bowyer v. Sweet Briar Inst., SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA, http://www.courts. 
state.va.us/courts/scv/oral_arguments/2015/jun/home.html. 
 111. Commonwealth ex rel. Bowyer v. Sweet Briar Inst., No. 150619, 2015 Va. LEXIS 
22, at *3–4 (June 9, 2015) (unpublished decision). 
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back to the circuit court, extending that court‘s injunction to June 
24 for further consideration on the matter.
112
 
5.  Settlement Reached 
As the litigation continued, so did attempts to settle the issue. 
On April 30, 2015, the Attorney General‘s office sent a letter to 
the parties expressing the desire to facilitate mediation so that 
the issue could be resolved.
113
 A professional mediator was 
brought in to facilitate discussions, and in the weeks leading up 
to the supreme court‘s hearing, all parties—including Bowyer, 
Saving Sweet Briar, the groups of students and parents, and the 
faculty and staff who had sued the college—were engaged in me-
diation in conjunction with the Attorney General‘s office.
114
 Alt-
hough by the day of the hearing no settlement had been reached, 
the rulings in favor of Bowyer and remand to the circuit court, to-
gether with the parallel actions by students, parents, and faculty, 
made settlement discussions more attractive. A hearing on re-
mand was set for Monday, June 22, 2015. However, on June 16, 
2015, a pretrial hearing was held in Bedford, Virginia, in which 
Judge Updike signaled that he would reverse his earlier decision 
on the trust issue. This gave further impetus to settlement. With 
the parties working through the weekend, on June 20, a memo-
randum of understanding among all parties, including the Attor-
ney General, was finally reached and was submitted to the 
court.
115
 
The memorandum of understanding outlined a proposed set-
tlement agreement between the parties, which ultimately provid-
ed that the College would remain open subject to certain condi-
 
 112. Id. at *6. 
 113. See Letter from John W. Daniel, II, Deputy Attorney General, (Apr. 30, 2015), 
SAVING SWEET BRIAR, https://savingsweetbriar.com/legal-proceedings/virginia-attorney-ge 
nerals-letter-regarding-sweet-briar-and-bowyer-troutman-sanders-response/. 
 114. Memorandum of Understanding between Ellen Bowyer, Saving Sweet Briar, Inc., 
Sweet Briar Institute, and the Attorney General of Virginia (June 20, 2015) [hereinafter 
Memorandum of Understanding], https://savingsweetbriar.com/legal-proceedings/settleme 
nt-agreement-memorandum-of-understanding/. The Memorandum of Understanding was 
―reached by and between Ellen Bowyer, in her capacity as the County Attorney for the 
County of Amherst, Saving Sweet Briar, Inc. (―SSB‖) (together with Bowyer, the ―Bowyer 
Plaintiffs‖), Sweet Briar Institute (the ―College‖), and the Attorney General of Virginia.‖ 
Id. 
 115. See id. 
SWEETBRIAR 511.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2016  1:14 PM 
2016] THE WILL TO PREVAIL 245 
 
tions.
116
 Under this proposal, Saving Sweet Briar was to deliver 
$12 million in donations for the operation of the College, with the 
first $2.5 million installment due by July 2.
117
 Further, the Attor-
ney General would consider the release of $16 million in restrict-
ed funds from the College‘s endowment. Once the initial install-
ment was delivered, the Board members would resign and be 
replaced by a new board, selected by Bowyer and Saving Sweet 
Briar.
118
 
At the hearing on June 22, all parties signed the proposal and 
came before the court. Judge Updike vacated his original order 
regarding his analysis of the trust issue pursuant to the supreme 
court‘s ruling and issued a consent settlement order approving 
the proposed settlement agreement.
119
 In speaking from the bench 
and vacating his previous order, Judge Updike conceded that his 
earlier conclusion on the trust issue was simply wrong, deferring 
to the supreme court‘s judgment and giving particular authorita-
tive weight to the amicus brief of the three professors as a relia-
ble and authoritative analysis.
120
 Judge Updike stated during the 
hearing, ―I‘m convinced that Sweet Briar College will not merely 
endure, it will prevail.‖
121
 
Following the settlement, Saving Sweet Briar met its July 2 
deadline, triggering the resignation of the old Board and the re-
placement with a new one. Phillip C. Stone, known for his previ-
ous tenure as President of Bridgewater College, became the new 
President.
122
 With new leadership in place, the decision to close 
the College was quickly reversed, and, in August 2015, students 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Virginia Judge Approves Deal to Keep Sweet Briar Col-
lege Open, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/23/us/virginia-
judge-approves-deal-to-keep-sweet-briar-college-open.html?_r=0; Susan Svrluga, Sweet 
Briar Survives: Judge Approves Settlement Deal to Keep the College Open, WASH. POST 
(June 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2015/06/22/sweet-
briar-survives-judge-approves-settlement-deal-to-keep-the-college-open/. 
 120. Transcript of Hearing before the Honorable James W. Updike, Jr. at 20–22, Com-
monwealth ex rel. v. Sweet Briar Inst., No. CL15009373-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 22, 2015) 
(Amherst County) (unpublished decision). 
 121. Id. at 26. 
 122. Mona Abdi, Phillip Stone Becomes Sweet Briar’s 12th President, WSET (July 2, 
2015), http://wset.com/news/sweet-briar-closing/phillip-stone-becomes-sweet-briars-12th-p 
resident. 
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returned.
123
 Saving Sweet Briar completed its $12 million com-
mitment on schedule in September 2015. The College has been 
saved, though further efforts will be needed as it works to recover 
from the fallout following the closure announcement.
124
 
There still remains no legal ruling on the merits of the allega-
tion that the Board violated trust law. But the law in Virginia 
advanced, insofar as the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that an 
entity can be both a corporation and a trust, thus distinguishing 
Dodge. This essay analyzes Virginia corporate and trust law in 
the context of the Sweet Briar case, addressing the relevant is-
sues raised by the case and the ramifications for nonprofit organ-
izations in Virginia. 
II.  RAMIFICATIONS FOR VIRGINIA COLLEGES AND OTHER 
NONPROFITS 
The landmark nature of the Sweet Briar case is not only due to 
the promising outcome for the College, but also to the legal ques-
tions the case presented. The distinctive aspects of the College‘s 
founding and legal structure contained the ingredients for a seri-
ous inquiry as to whether an organization can be both corporation 
and trustee. If an organization can be both a corporation and a 
trustee, additional questions arise: What were the obligations of a 
corporate trustee in this case? Who may enforce a charitable gift? 
This part first examines the overarching issue of whether an or-
ganization can be both a corporation and a trustee. 
A.  Can an Organization be a Corporation and a Trustee? 
Approaching the issue of whether an organization can assume 
the dual roles of corporation and trustee requires an examination 
of the relevant aspects and legal history surrounding Sweet Briar 
College and distinguishing this case from others. Specifically, it is 
 
 123. Jessie Pounds, Sweet Briar College Students Return to Campus, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH (Aug. 26, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/article_18 
237524-3b44-54ce-947a-a1caf5713a6a.html. 
 124. See Katherine Flynn, Saving Sweet Briar College, One Coat of Paint at a Time, 
NAT‘L TR. FOR HISTORIC PRES. (Sept 10, 2015), https://savingplaces.org/stories/saving-sw 
eet-briar-college-one-coat-of-paint-at-a-time#.V2FRn1Uwjcs. 
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important to understand how the 2015 Sweet Briar case is distin-
guishable from Dodge v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon Woman’s 
College, and the founding Sweet Briar College.  
B.  Distinguishing Dodge 
In Dodge, students from a private women‘s college, Randolph-
Macon Woman‘s College (―RMWC‖), brought suit to block the Col-
lege‘s impending transformation into a coeducational institu-
tion.
125
 The students alleged that RMWC, a charitable non-stock 
corporation, was also a charitable trust under Virginia Code sec-
tion 2.2-507.1.
126
 Under this code section, ―assets of a charitable 
corporation incorporated in or doing any business in Virginia 
shall be deemed to be held in trust . . . .‖
127
 The students argued 
that this provision renders a charitable corporation subject to the 
Uniform Trust Code.
128
 
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that RMWC was not a 
trust because section 2.2-507.1 does not ―render[] a nonstock 
charitable corporation subject to . . . the Uniform Trust Code‖ or 
―transform all charitable Virginia nonstock corporations into 
charitable trusts.‖
129
 The court stated that, rather, the provision 
merely serves to give the Attorney General authority to protect 
public interests in charitable corporation assets.
130
 
In the Sweet Briar case, the College argued before the Supreme 
Court of Virginia that Dodge conclusively determined that the 
Virginia Uniform Trust Code did not apply to the College.
131
 ―As 
this Court held in Dodge,‖ the College asserted, ―the General As-
sembly has ‗made clear . . . that directors of charitable nonstock 
corporations remain subject to existing statutory and common 
law related to those corporations.‖
132
 Instead, according to the Col-
 
 125. See Dodge v. Trs. of Randolph-Macon Woman‘s Coll., 276 Va. 10, 13, 661 S.E.2d 
805 (2008). 
 126. See id. at 10, 13, 661 S.E.2d at 807. 
 127. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-507.1 (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
 128. See Dodge, 276 Va. at 13, 661 S.E.2d at 806–07. 
 129. Id. at 10, 16–17, 661 S.E.2d at 806, 808. 
 130. See id. at 10, 16, 661 S.E.2d at 806, 808. 
 131. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Appeal, supra note 60, at 12. 
 132. Id. at 16 (quoting Dodge, 276 Va. at 16–17, 661 S.E.2d at 809). 
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lege, ―the directors of Sweet Briar are subject to the business 
judgment rule.‖
133
 
Bowyer, on the other hand, asserted that Dodge was legally 
and factually distinguishable for two reasons. First, Bowyer ar-
gued that Sweet Briar‘s status as a trustee had nothing to do 
with section 2.2-507.1.
134
 Instead, Bowyer relied on the two in-
struments that served to found Sweet Briar Institute: the will of 
Indiana Fletcher Williams (the ―Will‖) and a charter created by 
the 1901 Act of the General Assembly (the ―Charter‖).
135
 Dodge 
involved neither an actual trust instrument such as a will, nor a 
statutory decree implementing the terms of a will.
136
 
Second, though the court in Dodge held that RMWC was not a 
trustee, it did not hold that a charitable nonstock corporation can 
never be a trustee.
137
 What Dodge actually says, contrary to the 
circuit court‘s original reading in the Sweet Briar case, is that the 
Uniform Trust Code did not apply to RMWC specifically because 
it ―is not an express inter vivos trust, charitable trust, or non-
charitable trust created pursuant to a statute, judgment, or de-
cree.‖
138
 Thus, the supreme court in Sweet Briar‘s case found that 
the circuit court erred in its assertion that trust law cannot be 
applied to a corporation simply because it is a corporation.
139
 It 
follows, then, that the defining aspects of this issue in the context 
of Sweet Briar Institute are grounded in the founding of the Col-
lege and its formative documents. 
C.  Founding and Formative Documents 
Sweet Briar College lies in Amherst County, Virginia amidst 
what was once a plantation inherited and owned by Indiana 
Fletcher Williams. Williams died testate having survived both 
her husband and her young daughter and having included her 
 
 133. Id.; Brief in Opposition to Petition for Appeal, supra note 60, at 16. 
 134. See Petition for Review, supra note 58, at 9–11. 
 135. See id. at 9. 
 136. See id. at 10. 
 137. See id. at 9–10. 
 138. Dodge v. Trs. of Randolph-Macon Woman‘s Coll., 276 Va. 10, 17, 661 S.E.2d 805, 
809 (2008). 
 139. See Commonwealth ex rel. Bowyer v. Sweet Briar Inst., No. CL150619-00, 2015 
LEXIS 22, at *3 (Va. June 9, 2015) (unpublished decision). 
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―Sweet Briar Plantation‖ in her last will and testament.
140
 The 
Will states: 
I give and devise all my plantation and tract of land known as Sweet 
Briar Plantation . . . and also the rest and remainder of all my real 
and personal property . . . unto [four named persons] as Trustees up-
on the trusts and with the powers and duties hereinafter specified, 
that is to say: 
I direct the said trustees forthwith after my decease, to procure 
the incorporation in the State of Virginia, of a corporation to be 
called the ―Sweet Briar Institute,‖ such corporation to be creat-
ed by due process of law, either under the general laws relating 
to the formation of corporations or by a special charter to be 
obtained from the Legislature of the State of Virginia.
141
 
The Will also places restrictions on the corporation‘s alienation 
of the Sweet Briar property and endowment income and imposes 
duties of investment, proclaiming an underlying purpose to estab-
lish a ―perpetual memorial‖ for Williams‘ late daughter, Daisy.
142
 
In the 2015 Sweet Briar case, Bowyer argues that the language of 
this document is sufficient to establish a testamentary trust.
143
 
This was the original document that founded Sweet Briar College 
and, by its own instruction, led to the subsequent incorporation of 
Sweet Briar Institute as a charitable nonprofit corporation.
144
 
In 1901, an Act of the Virginia General Assembly created the 
Charter establishing Sweet Briar Institute as a nonprofit corpo-
ration.
145
 At the time, it was a common and often necessary prac-
tice to form a nonprofit corporation in order to carry out the pur-
poses of a charitable trust.
146
 In its opposition to Bowyer‘s 2015 
petition for review, the College asserted that the Charter clearly 
established the school as a charitable corporation and nothing 
more.
147
 While the Charter expressly established Sweet Briar In-
stitute as a corporation, it also incorporated the terms of the Will 
and authorizes the corporation to ―accept the real and personal 
property . . . devised and bequeathed [in the Will], subject to the 
 
 140. See The Will, supra note 12, at 2. 
 141. Id. at 2–3. 
 142. Id. at 4. 
 143. See Petition for Review, supra note 58, at 7. 
 144. See The Will, supra note 12, at 3. 
 145. See Act of Feb. 9, 1901, ch. 123, 1901 Va. Acts 125. 
 146. See Professors‘ Brief, supra note 104, at 11. 
 147. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Appeal, supra note 60, at 12. 
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terms and conditions specifically prescribed in the said [W]ill.‖
148
 
In light of this language of the Will and incorporation of its terms 
into a legislative act, Bowyer argued that Sweet Briar Institute is 
a trustee of a testamentary charitable trust.
149
 While there is no 
dispositive ruling on whether Sweet Briar is or is not a trustee, 
the supreme court‘s ruling makes it clear that an organization 
can be both a trustee and a corporation. The circumstances of the 
College‘s formation make a very strong case that it is both. 
D.  Prior Legal History 
Events following the College‘s founding also speak to these is-
sues.
150
 The Charter remains in effect, though it has since been al-
tered by legislation.
151
 In 1908, the Virginia General Assembly 
enacted legislation, allowing an ―incorporated educational institu-
tion‖ to sell part of its land in excess of a certain amount, ―not-
withstanding any provision in its charter, or in the deed, will or 
munument [sic] of title under which said real estate is held.‖
152
 
This enactment was apparently requested by Sweet Briar Insti-
tute.
153
 As stated by the college years later in Sweet Briar Insti-
tute v. Button, the legislation was enacted to ―permit sale of a por-
tion of the real estate . . . acquired by Sweet Briar from Mrs. 
Williams.‖
154
 This corporate code amendment suggests an under-
standing by both the college and the General Assembly that the 
 
 148. Act of Feb. 9, 1901, ch. 123, 1901 Va. Acts 125, 127. 
 149. See Petition for Review, supra note 58, at 8–11. 
 150. Ms. Williams‘ will has withstood prior challenge from her own family in 1900, and 
also when the County of Amherst sued in 1901 for back taxes. See Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams‘ Ex‘r, 102 Va. 778, 779–80, 47 S.E. 567, 867–68 (1904); Nicole Steenburgh, A Prevail-
ing Will: Sweet Briar College Founder’s Will Has Survived Many Challenges, NEWS & 
ADVANCE (July 1, 2015, 10:26 AM), http://www.newsadvance.com/new_era_ progress/news 
/a-prevailing-will-sweet-briar-college-founder-s-will-has/article_2f84a228-1ffd-11e5-b0c9-e 
ba0ff711a50.html. 
 151. See KATHERINE A. HEARN, THE INTEGRATION OF SWEET BRIAR, THE SWEET BRIAR 
COLLEGE CASE 1963–1967 1 (1985), https://ia801307.us.archive.org/28/items/TheIntegrati 
onOfSweetBriarTheSweetBriarCollegeCase19631967/The%20Integration%20of%20Sweet 
%20Briar:%20The%20Sweet%20Briar%20College%20Case%201963%20-%201967.pdf (dis-
cussing the legal battle in the mid-1960s to desegregate the college). 
 152. Act of Feb. 8, 1908, ch. 29, 1908 Va. Acts 35. 
 153. See Professors‘ Brief, supra note 104, at 5. 
 154. Id. at 4 (quoting Jurisdictional Statement at 8, Sweet Briar Inst. v. Button, 387 
U.S. 423 (1966) (No. 1106)). 
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original act granting the Charter is to remain in effect and can be 
altered only by subsequent legislation.
155
 
The Button case, mentioned above, occurred in the 1960s, years 
after the founding and code amendment. In Button, the College 
sued the Commonwealth of Virginia, seeking to invalidate a por-
tion of the Will that only allowed the College to educate ―white 
girls and young women.‖
156
 After an abstention by the lower court, 
the case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
157
 In 
its appeal, Sweet Briar told the Court that it was ―seeking to en-
join Virginia state officers from enforcing a racial restriction con-
tained in a will under which appellant holds property as trustee of 
an educational trust.‖
158
 Bowyer used this statement to reinforce 
her claim that the College is a trustee and while not treated by 
the Supreme Court of Virginia as dispositive, it is certainly strong 
evidence.
159
 
E.  What Were the Obligations of the College as Corporate Trustee 
in This Case? 
1.  Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act 
The Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds 
Act
160
 (UPMIFA or the ―Act‖) is a revision of the Uniform Man-
agement of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA), and was adopted by 
the Uniform Law Commission in 2006.
161
 The Act ―guides chari-
ties on the management and investment of funds, provides rules 
on spending from endowment funds, and permits the release of 
restrictions on the use and management of charitable funds.‖
162
 
 
 155. See id. at 5. 
 156. Sweet Briar Inst. v. Button, 280 F. Supp. 312, 312 (W.D. Va. 1967) (quoting The 
Will, supra note 12, at 3). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Jurisdictional Statement at 6, Sweet Briar Inst. v. Button, 387 U.S. 923 (1967) 
(No. 1106) (emphasis added). 
 159. See Petition for Review, supra note 58, at 11–12. 
 160. UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT, UNIF. L. COMM‘N 
(2006) [hereinafter UPMIFA]. 
 161. See Susan Gary, UMIFA Becomes UPMIFA, UNIF. L. COMM‘N (2007), http://uni 
formlaws.org/Shared/Docs/UMIFA%20Becomes%20UPMIFA.pdf. 
 162. Id. 
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Forty-seven states, including Virginia, have adopted UPMIFA.
163
 
The Act updates the applicable prudence standard for the man-
agement of charitable funds, modernizes the rules governing ex-
penditures from these funds, and allows for the modification of 
restrictions on these funds to facilitate more efficient manage-
ment.
164
 UPMIFA is applicable to charities organized as either 
nonprofit corporations or as trusts.
165
 
Under UPMIFA, the overarching standard of care for the man-
agement of charitable funds is prudence.
166
 This UPMIFA pru-
dence standard is a blend of corporate and trust law and takes 
language from different statutes.
167
 Individuals who manage and 
invest institutional funds are required to: (i) give primary consid-
eration to donor intent as expressed in a gift instrument; (ii) act 
in good faith with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like 
position would exercise; (iii) incur only reasonable costs in invest-
ing and managing charitable funds; (iv) make a reasonable effort 
to verify relevant facts; (v) make decisions about each asset in the 
context of the portfolio of investments as part of an overall in-
vestment strategy; (vi) diversify investments unless, due to spe-
cial circumstances, the purposes of the fund are better served 
without diversification; (vii) dispose of unsuitable assets, and, in 
general; and (viii) develop an investment strategy appropriate for 
the fund and the institution.
168
 These factors taken together put 
the manager of the trust under several fiduciary duties: a duty of 
loyalty, care, cost minimization, and investigation.
169
 
When donor intent is clearly expressed, UPMIFA requires the 
trustee give effect to that intent.
170
 If the donor‘s intent is not 
clearly expressed, the Act requires the trust to be prudently man-
 
 163. Id.; LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET—PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS 
ACT, UNIF. LAW COMM‘N, http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Prudent 
%20Management%20of%20Institutional%20Funds%20Act (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
 164. Gary, supra note 161. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. (discussing UPMIFA‘s use of language from the Revised Model Nonprofit Cor-
poration Act and the Uniform Prudent Investor Act). 
 168. UPMIFA, supra note 160, at § 3; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1101 (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
 169. UPMIFA, supra note 160, at § 3 cmt.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1102 (Repl. Vol. 
2012). 
 170. UPMIFA, supra note 160, at § 3. 
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aged in ways consistent with the purpose of the fund with the aim 
of continuing the fund into perpetuity.
171
 These requirements en-
sure that funds are used in a manner consistent with donor in-
tent, are protected long-term, and will continue to be used for 
such purposes in the future.
172
 UPMIFA‘s prefatory note explicitly 
states that the doctrine of cy pres, which will be discussed in more 
detail below, still applies to nonprofit corporations and charitable 
trusts alike.
173
 
Funds must be managed with two fundamental duties in mind: 
first, the duty to comply with the donor‘s intent and, second, the 
duty to act in accordance with the purposes of the institution 
when making management and investment decisions.
174
 The lan-
guage creating the duty of care in UPMIFA is similar to that 
found in the Model Business Corporation Act, and imposes the 
duty to act in good faith, ―with the care an ordinarily prudent 
person in a like position would exercise under similar circum-
stances.‖
175
 To fulfill this duty, the trustee must minimize the 
costs associated with management of the funds, and ensure the 
accuracy of information upon which the trustee relies when mak-
ing investment decisions through reasonable investigation.
176
 
Additionally, UPMIFA includes an optional provision, creating 
a presumption of imprudence if the institution spends more than 
7 percent of its endowment in any one year.
177
 Even though not 
adopted in Virginia, the 7 percent threshold provides a good base-
line when analyzing excessive spending from an endowment fund. 
In sum, for its decisions to be considered ―prudent‖ an institution 
must always take into account its mission, as defined in the do-
nor‘s original intent, and ensure its actions further that mission. 
2.  Sweet Briar Examined Under UPMIFA 
As previously discussed, Saving Sweet Briar hired Steven 
Spitzer, an expert accountant with experience in college and uni-
 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. 
 173. Id. at Prefactory Note. 
 174. Id. at § 3 cmt. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at § 3. 
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versity finances, to examine the College‘s audited financial 
statements.
178
 The report concluded that ―the College was not in 
dire financial straits just eight months before the College‘s Board 
and Interim Presidentannounced they were closing . . . .‖
179
 Mr. 
Spitzer relied on a study from Forbes magazine, the CFI, and the 
financial responsibility composite score used by the Department 
of Education that is based on official audited financial state-
ments. 
It appeared the College‘s financial situation had at least stabi-
lized if not improved in recent years. In comparison to other col-
leges in the region in terms of endowment size Sweet Briar was 
above average, and ranked in the top half of private schools in 
Virginia.
180
 Since 2009, the College‘s asset-to-liability ratio has 
improved and in fact its endowment is up by nearly $10 million.
181
 
Despite these positive trends, Bowyer—and the plaintiffs in the 
parallel litigation—alleged the Board made no meaningful effort 
to cut costs, raise additional funds, hire an admissions director to 
boost enrollment, or otherwise find a path to long-term prosperi-
ty.
182
 While opponents of closure viewed this course of conduct by 
the Board as suggesting a failure to meet the requirements of 
UPMIFA, it was never necessary for a court to resolve this issue 
due to the settlement. 
F.  Cy Pres Doctrine 
Charitable trusts are potentially infinite in duration.
183
 This 
perpetual nature can lead to problems when the settler‘s original 
intent becomes outdated, obsolete, or even illegal as circumstanc-
es and society change over time.
184
 When such circumstances 
arise, the doctrine of cy pres requires that a testator‘s intent be 
 
 178. UPDATE: CPA Releases Report on Sweet Briar’s Finances; School Responds, 
WSET, (Apr. 7, 2015) http://wset.com/news/sweet-briar-closing/sweet-briar-college-respon 
ds-to-forensic-accountants-review. 
 179. SPITZER REPORT, supra note 70. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Jacobs, supra note 26. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Roger G. Sisson, Comment, Relaxing the Dead Hand’s Grip: Charitable Efficiency 
and the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REV. 635, 635 (1988). 
 184. Id. 
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carried out ―as near as possible‖ to the exact manner originally 
specified.
185
 In Virginia, the doctrine has been codified and allows 
courts to modify or terminate a trust when its charitable purpose 
has become ―unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or 
wasteful.‖
186
 For the doctrine to be invoked there must be a valid 
charitable trust with an existing charitable intent. Additionally, 
the beneficiaries of the trust must be indefinite or uncertain, or 
the purpose of the trust must be impossible or impracticable to 
perform.
187
 Following the doctrine, the trust is then modified or 
terminated, and the assets of the trust are used for a purpose 
that aligns as closely as possible with the original intent of the 
donor.
188
  
If the doctrine of cy pres had been invoked in this case, the 
Board would not have acted unilaterally, but would have gone to 
court to seek permission to close the College. A judge then would 
have decided if the purpose of the Will could no longer be carried 
out and, if not, how best to adhere to Williams‘ original intent.
189
 
Assuming this court agreed that the College needed to close (not a 
likely result), the court would stipulate the College‘s remaining 
endowment and other assets be used for a charitable purpose, 
probably providing young women with higher education.
190
 Ac-
cording to Reid Weisbord, Vice Dean and Professor of Law at 
Rutgers University, the Board could not sell the schools assets 
without court approval, and it is highly unlikely the Board could 
have obtained court approval in light of the clear restrictions of 
Williams‘ Will.
191
 However, the Board did not seek modification of 
the Will prior to announcing closure.
192
 
 
 185. United States ex rel. United States Coast Guard v. Cerio, 831 F. Supp. 530, 535 
(E.D. Va. 1993) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 55-31 (Repl. Vol. 1992)). 
 186. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-731 (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
 187. Id. 
 188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 399 (AM. LAW INST. 1959). 
 189. Abby Jackson, A Virginia College That’s Imploding Can’t be Sold, According to the 
Founder’s Last Will and Testament, BUS. INSIDER (Mar 9, 2015, 3:08 PM), http://www.bus 
inessinsider.com/sweet-briar-college-land-cannot-be-sold-according-to-founders-last-will-
and-testament-2015-3. 
 190. See id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Exhibit A to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 66. 
SWEETBRIAR 511.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2016  1:14 PM 
256 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:227 
 
Instead, believing trust laws did not apply to the College, and 
that the Board‘s decisions regarding the future of the College 
were restricted only by the business judgment rule, the Board 
first decided to close the college and then considered how to dis-
pose of its assets. The Board voted to close the college on Febru-
ary 28, 2015, before sending a letter on March 25, 2015, request-
ing that the Attorney General authorize the release or modifi-
cation of certain restrictions on the use of the college‘s funds.
193
 In 
the letter, the Board proposed to use the funds for the orderly 
wind up of the College, to provide support for transitioning stu-
dents and faculty, and to dispose of the College‘s tangible and real 
property.
194
 As a corporate trustee, the Board had a duty to give 
effect to Ms. Williams‘ originally expressed intent, and the 
Board‘s decision to close the College and use its funds contrary to 
the purpose of the trust does not comply with the cy pres doctrine. 
G.  Virginia Charitable Solicitations Act 
As a nonprofit institution of higher education, Sweet Briar is 
classified as a charitable organization under Virginia law,
195
 
which defines a charitable organization as ―any person that is or 
holds itself out to be organized or operated for any charitable 
purpose, or any person which solicits or obtains contributions so-
licited from the public.‖
196
 The College is a non-stock corporation 
registered with the State Corporation Commission that actively 
solicits contributions from the public.
197
 As a charitable organiza-
tion, Sweet Briar has a duty to spend money in a manner con-
sistent with the general purposes for which those funds were so-
licited.
198
 The Charitable Solicitations Act makes it unlawful to 
use ―funds raised by a charitable solicitation for any purpose oth-
 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See VA. CODE. ANN. § 57-60(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2016) (stating 
that while ―exempt from the registration requirements of § 57-49,‖ institutions of higher 
education shall be subject to the provisions of section 57-60). 
 196. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-48 (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Cum. Supp. 2016). Additionally, ―per-
son‖ means ―any individual, organization, trust, foundation, association, partnership, cor-
poration, society, or other group or combination acting as a unit.‖ Id. 
 197. President’s Office, SWEET BRIAR COLLEGE, http://sbc.edu/president/board-of-direct 
ors/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
 198. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-57(N) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
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er than the solicited purpose or, with respect to funds raised by 
general appeals, the general purpose of the charitable or civic or-
ganization on whose behalf the solicitation was made.‖
199
 
Donations to nonprofit institutions typically fall into two cate-
gories, restricted and unrestricted funds.
200
 Unrestricted funds, 
which constitute the majority of donations, may be used for any 
general purpose, including day-to-day operations.
201
 Boards of di-
rectors may allocate unrestricted funds for any purpose, so long 
as such funds are used in a manner that falls within the general 
purpose of the organization. Funds that are specifically donated 
for certain purposes are considered restricted, and must be used 
in a manner consistent with the purpose for which they were giv-
en.
202
 Once the Board decided to close the college, it sought the 
removal of restrictions on various institutional funds,
203
 and it 
took the position that funds donated for general purposes may be 
used to close down the College.
204
 
Sweet Briar has a history of actively soliciting funds for the 
purpose of operating the College. For instance, a document from 
2011 soliciting donations was provided to visitors of the College‘s 
website and provided an explanation of how the College intended 
to use donated funds.
205
 The document speaks solely of using do-
nated funds in a manner related to the ongoing operation of the 
College.
206
 There is no indication that the funds could or would be 
used to shut down the school. Even if these funds technically fall 
in the unrestricted category, they still must be used for the gen-
eral purpose of operating the College, not for the contrary pur-
pose of shutting down the College. 
To adhere to the language and spirit of the Charitable Solicita-
tions Act, Sweet Briar must use donated funds to carry out its 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Joanne Fritz, What Are Restricted and Unrestricted Funds for a Nonprofit?, 
ABOUT MONEY, (Oct. 31, 2015), http://nonprofit.about.com/od/glossary/g/restricted.html. 
 201. Id. 
 202. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-57(N) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
 203. Exhibit A to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 66. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See The Annual Fund at Work, SWEET BRIAR COLLEGE (2011), http://webcache.goo 
gleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:1KlVdktID9wJ:sbc.edu/sites/default/files/Annual_Fun 
d/Annual%2520Fund%2520at%2520Work%25202011%2520Updated%2520012011.pdf+&c 
d=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. 
 206. Id. 
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purpose as set forth in Mrs. Williams‘ will and as generally un-
derstood by its donors. Thousands of alumnae have contributed 
millions of dollars with the expectation that the funds would be 
used for the operational purposes advertised on the college‘s web-
site. When the decision was made to close the College, the Board 
proposed to use these funds for the purpose of closing the school, 
an action that Bowyer claimed would violate the Charitable Solic-
itations Act. It was this action that Judge Updike enjoined, thus 
indicating, as a legal matter, the circuit court‘s agreement, if only 
preliminary, with Bowyer‘s position. 
H.  Who May Enforce a Charitable Trust? 
The Board‘s opposition to the lawsuit filed by Bowyer focused 
largely on contesting the County Attorney‘s standing to bring the 
case. A provision of the Virginia Uniform Trust Code (―VUTC‖), 
section 64.2-723(C), empowers the ―settlor of a charitable trust, 
among others, [to] maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust.‖
207
 
While ―others‖ is not defined, another provision of the VUTC, 
Virginia Code section 64.2-805, emphasizes ―the need to promote 
uniformity of the law . . . among states that enact [the Uniform 
Trust Code].‖
208
 This statute enhances the persuasive authority of 
court decisions in other states interpreting the ―among others‖ 
language. In addition, the Comments of the Uniform Trust Code 
(the ―Comments‖) provide a helpful guide assuring interest in en-
acting the VUTC.
209
 
1.  Attorney General 
The Attorney General is charged with representing the inter-
ests of the people of Virginia.
210
 He undoubtedly has authority to 
enforce public interests in a charitable trust on behalf of the 
 
 207. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-723(C) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (emphasis added). 
 208. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-805 (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
 209. See Brief of Amici Curiae Hon. John Chapman Petersen et al., in Support of the 
Commonwealth‘s Petition for Review at 5, Commonwealth ex rel. Bowyer v. Sweet Briar 
Inst., No. CL150619, 2015 LEXIS 22 (Va. June 9, 2015) [hereinafter Legislators‘ Brief]. 
 210. About the Office, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, http://www.oag. 
state.va.us/our-office/about-the-office#responsibilities (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
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Commonwealth. Virginia Code section 64.2-708(D) gives the At-
torney General the rights of a qualified beneficiary of a charitable 
trust.
211
 In the Sweet Briar matter, however, the Attorney Gen-
eral declined to take enforcement action. 
The Board argued that the Attorney General has exclusive au-
thority to bring a suit on behalf of the public to protect charitable 
trust assets.
212
 The Board also suggested that the County Attor-
ney lacked standing because the VUTC gives various grants of 
authority to the Attorney General but never mentions county at-
torneys.
213
 The Comment to UTC section 405 states that granting 
the settlor standing to enforce a trust ―does not negate the right 
of the state attorney general or persons with special interests to 
enforce either the trust or their interests.‖
214
 
Similarly, the Comment to UTC section 1001 says that ―the 
state attorney general . . . and other persons with a special inter-
est‖ also have standing to enforce a charitable trust.
215
 The Com-
ment also cites the Restatement (Second) of Trusts section 391, 
which recognizes that other ―person[s] who [have] a special inter-
est‖ including ―other public officer[s]‖ within this scope of authori-
ty as well.
216
 Bowyer argued that the County Attorney qualified 
under the person with a special interest‖ and as ―other public of-
ficer‖ categories.
217
 
2.  Other States 
Other states have recognized broader standing for other citi-
zens when the attorney general declines to file a suit to enforce a 
trust. In Valley Forge Historical Society v. Washington Memorial 
 
 211. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-708(D) (Repl. Vol. 2012). Virginia Code section 64.2-
708(D) deems the Attorney General a qualified beneficiary of a charitable trust. Id. 
 212. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Appeal, supra note 60, at 8. 
 213. See id. The Board also argued that the County Attorney‘s efforts to enjoin Sweet 
Briar from closing ran afoul of UPMIFA because it potentially placed the College ―in the 
untenable position of working with the Commonwealth through the Attorney General on 
one hand and litigating with the Commonwealth through the County Attorney on the oth-
er.‖ Id. at 7. The Board asserted that the ―Commonwealth cannot take contradictory posi-
tions regarding [the College‘s] ability to close and/or its ability to redirect donated funds 
for another purpose under UPMIFA.‖ Id. 
 214. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405 CMT. (UNIF. LAW COMM‘N 2015) (emphasis added). 
 215. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1001 CMT. (UNIF. LAW COMM‘N 2015). 
 216. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (AM. LAW INST. 1959)). 
 217. See Petition for Review, supra note 58, at 14. 
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Chapel, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that a histori-
cal society had standing to enforce the terms of a charitable trust 
that founded a chapel out of which the historical society operated 
a museum.
218
 The attorney general declined to participate in the 
lawsuit, which claimed that evicting the museum violated of the 
terms of the trust.
219
 The court held that the historical society‘s re-
lationship and historical ties with the chapel gave it ―special in-
terest‖ standing to enforce the trust once the attorney general de-
clined to do so.
220
 
In Kapiolani Park Preservation Society v. City & County of 
Honolulu, the City of Honolulu, Hawaii sought to lease a park, 
which had been established as a charitable trust, to a private en-
tity.
221
 When the attorney general declined to file suit, citizens 
formed a non-profit corporation and sued on behalf of the public 
to enforce the trust and prevent the lease.
222
 The court held that 
the corporation had standing since the trustee ―will not seek in-
structions of the court as to its duties,‖ and the ―attorney general, 
as parens patriae, has abandoned the defense of the possible 
rights of the beneficiary of the trust, the public.‖
223
 
Multiple legislators agreed with Bowyer‘s argument that, as 
the Amherst County Attorney, she had a special interest in Sweet 
Briar College due to the County‘s close relationship with and his-
torical ties to the College and the hardship faced by the County if 
the College were to close.
224
 Furthermore, Bowyer‘s involvement 
was arguably the County‘s only path to a remedy since the Attor-
ney General declined to take enforcement action.
225
 While there is 
no ruling on Bowyer‘s standing in the Sweet Briar case, the au-
thorities suggest that enforcement authority under the VUTC can 
 
 218. Valley Forge Historical Soc‘y v. Wash. Memorial Chapel, 426 A.2d 1123, 1127 (Pa. 
1981). 
 219. See id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See Kapiolani Park Pres. Soc‘y v. City and Cty. of Honolulu, 751 P.2d 1022, 1024 
(Haw. 1988). 
 222. See id. at 1024–25. 
 223. Id. at 1024 (reasoning that holding otherwise would leave the public unprotected 
and without a remedy); see also Jones v. Grant, 344 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Ala. 1977) (holding 
that ―students of a charitable institution are beneficiaries of a charitable trust,‖ and have 
a ―special interest which would entitle [them] to sue without making the attorney general 
a party‖). 
 224. See Legislators‘ Brief, supra note 209, at 6–8. 
 225. See id. at 8. 
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be undertaken by others besides the Attorney General. Further 
examination would suggest that this is not merely limited to pri-
vate parties. 
3.  Local Government Officers 
Although reported cases on the issue are not definitive, it ap-
pears that public officials other than the attorney general have 
historically had authority and even the duty to enforce a trust in 
Virginia. In Fitzgerald v. Doggett’s Executor, the Supreme Court 
of Virginia held that the Commonwealth‘s Attorney had standing 
to sue on behalf of the Commonwealth to enforce a trust ―if the 
trustee fails in the execution of [the] trust.‖
226
 The court reasoned 
that a statute imposed upon the Commonwealth‘s Attorney a du-
ty to ensure that a trust does not fail for lack of a trustee or for a 
trustee‘s failure to act.
227
 
Additionally, in the Button case, the College stated that the 
Commonwealth‘s Attorney and Attorney General both have re-
sponsibility to enforce educational trusts as officers of the Com-
monwealth.
228
 This statement, together with cases like Fitzgerald, 
demonstrates that these two types of public officers have histori-
cally shared the duty to enforce charitable trusts.
229
 
Although a County Attorney is not the same position as a 
Commonwealth‘s Attorney, a 1968 law that provided for the ap-
pointment of county attorneys is helpful to the analysis.
230
 Under 
Virginia Code section 15.2-1542, routine civil enforcement duties 
transferred from the local Commonwealth‘s Attorney to the coun-
ty attorney upon appointment.
231
 Thus, it arguably follows that 
the established role of Commonwealth‘s Attorneys extends to 
county attorneys as a civil enforcement authority transferred 
pursuant to statute.
232
 
 
 226. Fitzgerald v. Doggett‘s Executor, 155 Va. 112, 129, 155 S.E. 129, 135 (1930). 
 227. See id.; see also Tauber v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 445, 451, 499 S.E.2d 839, 842 
(1998) (holding that the Commonwealth‘s Attorney could properly bring a suit to require a 
trustee to carry out the terms and obligations set out in the respective trust). 
 228. See Complaint at 2, Sweet Briar Inst. v. Button, 280 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Va. 1966). 
 229. See Legislators‘ Brief, supra note 209, at 11. 
 230. See id. at 12. 
 231. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1542 (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
 232. See Legislators‘ Brief, supra note 209, at 12. 
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CONCLUSION 
Over its one hundred-plus year history, Sweet Briar developed 
into a premiere educational institution for young women. The 
College distinguished itself by focusing on a practical, hands-on 
curriculum, which shaped its students into ―useful members of 
society.‖
233
 The abrupt announcement to close the school was met 
with great resistance. Ultimately, the decision to close was de-
feated by a group of passionate alumnae, students, faculty, staff, 
and a tenacious county attorney who would not give up and see 
the College close without a fight. 
Sweet Briar is unlike most colleges in that it was founded pur-
suant to a will, which not only established the college over a cen-
tury ago, but was the linchpin in the fight to save the school. The 
unique set of facts presented by this case created the opportunity 
to explore and define the boundaries and connections between 
Virginia corporate and trust law. With potentially profound legal 
consequences, the Sweet Briar case was followed—and continues 
to be followed—closely by nonprofits from across the country.
234
 
The distinctiveness of the College‘s origin and legal structure 
was outcome determinative. Despite settlement of the case leav-
ing some legal questions unanswered, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia ruled that the College can be a corporation and a trust, and 
it distinguished Dodge.
235
 Thus, the arguments made by the Col-
lege in its efforts to close may not be successfully made in the fu-
ture. 
Against all odds, Sweet Briar has been saved. While the an-
nouncement to close presented serious challenges, the college has 
met or exceeded fundraising and enrollment goals on its path to 
 
 233. The Will, supra note 12, at 4. 
 234. See, e.g., Ruth McCambridge, Codifying Governance Lessons Learned the Hard 
Way: Sweet Briar College’s New By-Laws, NONPROFIT Q. (May 31, 2016), https://nonprofit 
quarterly.org/2016/05/31/codifying-governance-lessons-learned-the-hard-way-sweet-briar-
colleges-new-by-laws/; Lily Lynch, Nonprofit Takeaways from Sweet Briar Saga, MASS. 
NONPROFIT NETWORK (July 7, 2015), http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cac 
he:3Eat_iFgDpAJ:massnonprofitnet.org/blog/nonprofit-takeaways-from-sweet-briar-saga/ 
+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us; Michael Peregrine, Sweet Briar’s Remarkable Reopening 
Has Lessons for All Nonprofits, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (June 23, 2015), https://philan 
thropy.com/article/Opinion-Sweet-Briar-s/231101. 
 235. Commonwealth ex rel. Bowyer v. Sweet Briar Inst., No. 150619, 2015 Va. LEXIS 
22 (June 9, 2015) (unpublished decision). 
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recovery. With new leadership, an energized alumnae communi-
ty, and a reinvigorated sense of purpose, the future looks bright 
for Sweet Briar. Never losing its will to prevail, the women‘s col-
lege nestled in the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains is back 
to its mission of empowering young women to build and shape the 
world around them, now and in perpetuity. 
 
